Because of the differences in intelligence of each person, the methods of reaching the goal are also different. The reason why the methods of reaching the goal are different is that probability and luck play a huge role, and at the same time, the difference of each person's intelligence plays a decisive role. This kind of influence is mainly concentrated on people with higher positions, because this kind of influence will increase with the advancement of positions.
The second feature: live response
The second characteristic of military action is the living response and the resulting interaction. Here we do not discuss the calculation difficulties of living response, because as mentioned earlier, the study of mental power as a factor is bound to be difficult, and this difficulty already includes calculation difficulties. What we want to say is that the interaction between the two sides of the war in the war is incompatible with all planning by its nature. In the course of military operations, different measures have very different effects on the enemy. However, any theory is based on similar phenomena, and absolutely special circumstances cannot be included. This special situation must be resolved by judgment and in any place. In actual military operations, action plans formulated in accordance with general conditions are often disrupted by unexpected special circumstances. Compared with other human activities, military activities rely more on personal talents and less on theoretical use. Certain principle.
The third characteristic: the uncertainty of all situations
All situations in the war are unpredictable and uncertain. This is a very special situation, because all actions seem to be carried out under dim light; moreover, everything is like clouds and moonlight. Like the next, the outline becomes very big and the look becomes weird. These things that cannot be seen completely due to the weak light can only be guessed by relying on, and solved by luck. Therefore, in the absence of an understanding of objective things, to achieve good results, one can only rely on talent, and even luck.
It is impossible to establish a rigid theory
In view of the above-mentioned characteristics of military activities, we must point out that it is completely impossible to attempt to establish a set of fixed military theories for military art, just like setting up a set of scaffolding to ensure that the commander has a basis for investigation. , It is also unrealistic. Even if it is possible, when the commander can only rely on his own wisdom and judgment to win the battle, he will abandon it, or even go the other way. Moreover, even if these rigid theories are comprehensive, there will be the kind of result we have said before: theory and reality are opposed, and talent and genius are not bound by laws.
The way out for establishing a theory--difficulties vary everywhere
There are two ways to get rid of these difficulties:
First, everything we talked about in our general discussion of the characteristics of military activities is not suitable for people in any position. The lower the position, the more important the courage to self-sacrifice, while the difficulties encountered in intelligence and judgment are relatively less, the things you can contact will be limited, the goals pursued, and the methods used are relatively simple. The situation we grasp is relatively accurate, because many of them are seen with our own eyes. And as the position rises, the difficulties become greater and greater. When reaching the position of the supreme commander, the difficulties also reach the highest point, so that all problems must be solved by the wisdom of genius.
Judging from the distinction of military activities themselves, the difficulties are not the same everywhere. The more the effects of military activities are embodied in the material aspect, the smaller the difficulties; the more they are embodied in the abstract spiritual realm and become the driving force of the will, the greater the difficulties will be. Therefore, it is much easier to formulate theories for the deployment, organization, and implementation of combat than to formulate theories for the actual use of combat. In the former case, material means are used to fight. Although it also contains spiritual factors, it is ultimately material-based. When using the effects of combat, that is, when material results become motivation, people are only in contact with spirit. In general, it is always easier to build a theory for tactics than for strategy.
Theory is an investigation, not a rigid dogma
The second way to establish a theory is based on the viewpoint that theory cannot be rigid, that is to say, theory cannot be a rule of action. If a certain activity always involves the same type of things, that is, to achieve the same type of goal and adopt the same type of means, then even if they themselves change very little and adopt various methods, they can still be used as the research object of a certain theory. However, this kind of practical investigation is the most important part of all theoretical research, and only this kind of investigation can be called a theory. This kind of investigation conducts careful analysis and discussion on the researched things, so that people have a clear understanding of things and can understand them in depth. The more a theory can enable people to understand the essence of things, the more it can turn objective knowledge into subjective initiative, and the more it can give full play to all problems that rely on wisdom to solve problems, that is, its ability to humans. It works by itself; if the theory can explore the various factors that constitute a war, it can clearly divide what seems to be confused at first, can fully explain the characteristics of its means, explain the possible effects of the means, and clarify the nature of the end. Critically clarify all the problems in the war, and then such a theory will accomplish its main task. People learn through books to make theories a compass for war issues, to show people the way forward and the direction of victory, and to cultivate their judgment ability in the process to prevent them from going astray.
If an expert spends his life's energy to fully explain an originally obscure problem, his understanding of this problem must be much deeper than someone who only spends a few months studying it. The purpose of establishing a theory is to allow others to use existing results that have been sorted and researched instead of sorting out materials and researching from scratch. Theory should cultivate the intelligence of future commanders. More precisely, it should inspire their self-study ability, rather than accompany them on the battlefield. This is like a brilliant teacher. The best teaching method is to guide and promote student development. Intelligence, rather than just teach them some specific knowledge for a lifetime.
If principles and rules can be derived naturally from theoretical research, and if truths can be naturally condensed into crystals of principles and rules, then not only will the theory not violate the natural laws of intellectual activity, but it will be like in the building of arches. Put these principles and rules into prominence just like laying a keystone. Of course, the reason the theory does this is to be consistent with the logical relationships that people think about and to clarify the confluence of clues, not to formulate a set of algebraic formulas for use on the battlefield. The purpose of these principles and rules is to determine the basic clues of thinking, not to point out the specific path of action like road signs.
Only by establishing theory can the contradiction between theory and practice be eliminated
Based on the above viewpoints, a satisfactory combat theory can be established, that is, a useful combat theory that does not contradict reality. As long as this theory is used properly, it will approach reality, and even completely eliminate the anomaly that theory is divorced from reality. This anomaly is usually caused by unreasonable theories. It is precisely because of it that theories are opposed to sound intellect, but unfortunately they often become a shield for those with poor intelligence, ignorance, and inherent stupidity.
Theory should examine the nature of ends and means-tactical ends and means. In tactics, the means is a well-trained army that fights, and the purpose is to win the battle. As for how to determine the concept of victory, I will explain it in more detail when studying battles. Here, as long as the enemy is forced to withdraw from the battlefield, giving up resistance is enough to become a sign of victory. In this way, the goal set by the strategy for combat was reached. This goal gives the battle a real meaning, and this meaning will inevitably have a certain impact on the nature of victory. A victory aimed at weakening the enemy’s power is not the same as a victory aimed at occupying a certain position. The purpose of the battle has a great influence on the formulation, organization and implementation of the entire combat plan. Therefore, the goal of the war Should also become a research object of tactics.
Corresponding conditions that cannot be separated from the use of tactics
There are certain conditions that are indispensable to combat, and they affect the combat more or less, so they must be considered when using the army.
These conditions are precisely terrain, time and climate.
terrain
Topography can be divided into two concepts: region and landform. Strictly speaking, if the battle is unfolded on the wasteland of Yimapingchuan, then the terrain will have negligible influence on the battle.
This situation may indeed happen in the steppe zone, but it is almost a fantasy in Europe. Therefore, it is impossible for the fighting between nations to be unaffected by the terrain.
time
Time is divided into day and night, but the scope of time that affects the entire battle is by no means limited to the boundary between day and night, because every battle has its own duration, and large-scale battles can even last for many hours. In terms of organizing a large-scale battle, it makes a big difference whether the battle starts in the morning or in the afternoon. Of course, there are many battles that are not affected by time. Generally speaking, the degree of influence of time on battles is still relatively limited.
climate
It is extremely rare that the climate has a decisive influence on the fighting. Generally speaking, only foggy weather will bring a certain influence.
Strategic goals and means
Strategically, there is only victory or defeat. The tactical result is the means, and the factor that leads to the peace is the ultimate goal. Strategically, the use of various means to achieve the goal is also inseparable from the conditions that affect this.
Various conditions are indispensable when using various means strategically, and these conditions constitute new means. These conditions include: regions and landforms, whose meaning should extend to the land and residents of the entire theater; time, not only includes the distinction between day and night, but also includes different seasons and climates, that is, the special phenomenon of severe cold.
The strategy combines the above conditions with the outcome of the battle, giving the battle a special purpose. However, as long as this purpose does not directly lead to peace, but is only subordinate, then it is only a means. Moreover, we can regard these different meanings of battle results or victories as some strategic means. Occupying an enemy's position is the result of the combined action of battle and terrain. A certain battle with a special purpose should be regarded as a strategic means, and a series of battles conducted under a common purpose, composed of higher combat units, should also be regarded as a means. A winter battle is an action that combines battle and season.
Therefore, only what is seen as a direct cause of peace can be a goal. What the theory studies should be the function and interrelationship of these ends and means.
Determine the means and objectives of the strategy based on experience
The first question is how can the strategy list these means and objectives accurately and in detail. If we adopt a philosophical method to obtain an inevitable result, we will be caught in various difficulties, preventing us from obtaining the logical necessity between combat and combat theory. Therefore, we can only rely on experience and conduct analysis and research based on the battle examples provided by the history of war. It is true that the conclusions drawn with this method are bound to have certain limitations, because it only applies to battles that are exactly the same as the battle history. This limitation is inevitable, because no matter what the situation is, the problems described by the theory must be abstracted from the history of warfare, at least they are relatively close to the history of warfare. It is not so much that this limitation exists in reality as it exists in the concept.
The biggest advantage of this method is that it can make the theory realistic, and will not mislead people into meaningless thinking, or get into the horns and flow into general empty talk or fantasy.
To what extent the means should be analyzed
The second question is to what extent the theoretical response means are analyzed. Obviously, it is enough to consider the various characteristics of their use. In terms of tactics, the range and lethality of various weapons are the most important. As for their structure, it can be said that they are irrelevant, because combat is not made of powdered charcoal, sulfur and saltpeter, nor is it made of artillery with copper and tin. , The combat uses effective ready-made weapons. In terms of strategy, what is needed is a military map, not a research triangulation measuring instrument; if you want to achieve brilliant results, you don’t need to discuss how to build a country, how to educate and manage the people, you only need to have a general understanding of the various countries’ societies in these aspects. Just pay attention to the current situation, and pay attention to the influence that these factors may have on the war under different circumstances.
The scope of knowledge is greatly reduced
It is obvious that the scope of knowledge required for combat has been greatly reduced, and the object of theoretical research has also been significantly reduced. A fully equipped army must possess a large amount of knowledge and skills that must be possessed when entering the battlefield and must be understood in general military activities. Before it is finally put into use in warfare, it must be refined into a few main conclusions, just like Thousands of small rivers must first merge into several large rivers before they flow into the sea. The main conclusions that go directly into the sea of war must be familiar and mastered by those who direct the war.
Great military geniuses can quickly grow into commanders rather than scholars. In fact, our research must be able to draw such a positive conclusion, otherwise our research is incorrect. Only this kind of conclusion can explain why those who have never been exposed to military activities can hold higher positions, or even be competent for the positions of commanders, and have made great achievements in the war; why outstanding commanders rarely come from knowledgeable Among scholars, most come from those whose environment does not allow them to acquire a large amount of book knowledge. Therefore, those who think that the training of the future commander must start with knowing all the details, or those who think it is beneficial to do so, have always been regarded as ridiculous nerds. Practice has proved that knowing all the details is not only useless, even harmful to the commander-in-chief, because human intelligence comes from the knowledge and ideas he accepts. Some knowledge and thoughts on major issues can make talents, but some knowledge and thoughts on subtle and minor issues, if they are not accepted as something irrelevant to oneself, can only limit one's own talents.
Past contradictions
In the past, people did not realize that the knowledge needed in war was very simple. They often conflated this knowledge with the large amount of knowledge and skills needed to serve the war. Therefore, when they were obviously in contradiction with real-world phenomena, I have to push everything that cannot be explained to the genius, thinking that the genius does not need the guidance of the theory, and the theory is not built for the genius.
Some people don’t recognize the usefulness of knowledge and attribute everything to talent. Some people who rely on talent to achieve their careers feel that extraordinary genius and profound knowledge seem to be very different. They never believe in theory and believe that combat depends entirely on personal wisdom and ability. The size of the is determined by the level of personal talent, so that they become skeptics without knowing it. Of course, such people are better than those who believe in false knowledge, but their opinions do not conform to the facts. Without accumulating certain concepts, it is impossible to engage in intellectual activities. Most of these ideas are not brought by innate, but acquired through acquired learning. These ideas are knowledge. Now we have to ask, what kind of knowledge does war need? To be precise, the knowledge needed for war should be knowledge that can help people face problems in war.