Fourth, pushing Blücher to the Rhine will cause a lot of panic. The most important thing is to make Schwarzenberg, a general known for his indecision and indecision, create greater fear and impression of failure. The Marquis of Schwarzenberg must be very aware of the blows suffered by the Prince of Württemberg in Monterot and the Earl of Wittgenstein in Mormand. If Blücher was hit hard on the completely isolated front from the Marne to the Rhine, the news would reach Schwarzenberg's ears like an avalanche. In order to put pressure on the coalition forces, Napoleon launched an offensive against Vitry at the end of March. This desperate action was obviously intended to intimidate the opponent. However, the situation at that time was very different from the beginning of the war. Napoleon was in Langcheng and Arsie. Both battles were defeated, and Blücher was leading an army of one hundred thousand close to Schwarzenberg.
Of course, the above reasons do not convince everyone, but those who are skeptical cannot at least refute that if Napoleon continues to approach the Rhine and threaten Schwarzenberg’s position, then Schwarzenberg will turn to attack. Paris, threatening Napoleon's base. Because the above reasons are sufficient to prove that Schwarzenberg will never march to Paris.
Now, let's talk about this problem again with the example cited in the 1796 war. Napoleon believed that he used the most effective tactics to defeat the Austrian army. Even if this was the case, the victory he could get was nothing but a false name, and it did not play a special role in the capture of Mantua. It must be pointed out that the tactics we have proposed are the most effective way to stop aid. Even if our thinking is the same as Napoleon, thinking that this tactic is not the most reliable, and even thinking that this tactic is less likely to win, then these two tactics must be compared: one is the grasp of victory. Larger, but less profitable, that is to say, less victories; the other is less sure of winning, but the victories are very brilliant. If this is the way to weigh the gains and losses, then the courageous people will definitely agree with the latter approach, and only those who look at the problem superficially will hold the opposite attitude. Napoleon was certainly not a coward, but under the circumstances at the time, he was unable to recognize the essence of the battle situation from historical experience and predict the possible outcome of the event as we are now.
When investigating tactics, it is often necessary to quote war history, which is extremely natural, because practical experience in military art is more valuable than all philosophies. Of course, this kind of historical quotation has its specific conditions, which we will discuss in a special chapter. It is a pity that these conditions seldom attract people's attention, so when quoted more can only increase conceptual confusion.
Here we have to look at a very important question, that is, to what extent can critics use a more comprehensive understanding of what is already known when judging a certain event, and use what has been proved as a result, or in other words When and where, put aside these existing things completely and think about the problem from the perspective of the person concerned.
If the critics want to praise or criticize the parties, they should try their best to look at the problems from the parties’ standpoint. On the one hand, they must collect and understand all the information that the parties have and all the reasons for the motives of the actions. On the other hand, it must exclude all the circumstances that the parties could not understand at the time, and at the same time put aside the known results of the war. However, this is just an ideal goal that people strive to pursue. In fact, it is completely impossible to achieve, because the specific reasons for a certain event will not be exactly the same in the eyes of the critics and in the eyes of the parties. Some small circumstances that may have an impact on the parties have not been verified, and some subjective motives have never been mentioned. Even those subjective motives mentioned are often mixed with many speculations. Most of these subjective motives are learned from the memoirs of the person concerned or people close to him. However, in the memoirs, the information on this aspect is often not very detailed, or the truth is deliberately concealed. Therefore, there must be many things that the parties understand that the critics simply cannot know.
In addition, it is even harder for critics to put aside materials they know more than the parties involved. If you just put aside accidents, that is, things that are not related to the event itself, it is still very easy; however, it is not only very difficult, or even impossible to put aside all important things.
Here we first talk about the results. If the result is not caused by accident, then after knowing the result, we can use the method of reverse reasoning to judge the cause of the result. This kind of inference cannot be influenced by the known result, because we are investigating these under the condition that we have already understood the result. Things, and some parts of them have to refer to known results in order to make reasonable judgments and give correct evaluations. For criticism, all the phenomena that appear in the history of war are the source of lessons. It is only natural for critics to use the conclusions drawn from a comprehensive inspection of history to clarify other unknowns. So, even though I sometimes want to set aside the results, I still can't do it completely.
This is not only true for the circumstances (results) that happened after the fact, even for the circumstances that happened before the event, that is, the same is true for those who decide to act. In most cases, the critics have more information in this area than the parties. Some people may think that it is easy to put aside the more knowledgeable part of the situation, but this is not the case. The parties’ knowledge of the pre-event and current situation does not rely solely on accurate information, but also on a large number of speculations or assumptions. Although the conditions to be understood are not all accidental, they are almost always assumed or speculated first. There is intelligence, so when exact intelligence is not available, the only way is to substitute speculation or hypothesis. It is not difficult to understand that for a critic who has already understood the prior or current situation, when he is considering the situation that the party does not understand, he should not be affected by the more material he has. However, we believe that it is impossible to completely abandon the material that we have mastered, just as the result is aside, and the reason is the same.
Therefore, in order to allow the critics to consider a specific action from the standpoint of the parties, its possibilities are often limited. In most cases, the critics can meet the actual requirements, but in some cases, they cannot fully meet the requirements. This should be noted.
In fact, it is neither necessary nor possible for the critics to be completely consistent with the parties. In war, what is needed is a tempered endowment, like in other technical or artistic activities, this endowment is called attainment. The accomplishments of the parties involved vary, and the highest ones are often higher than those of the critics. Which critic dares to compare his accomplishments with those of Frederick the Great or Napoleon? If a person with great talent can be criticized, then the critic should be allowed to take advantage of this advantage that he knows better than the person involved. Therefore, when commenting on the great commander, critics should not use the materials used by the great commander to test him like the math test, but should be based on the brilliant results of the great commander and his accuracy in the event. Analyze to appreciate his outstanding talents and understand the inner connections of things predicted by his wise eyes.
In addition, regardless of the party’s attainments, even if they have low attainments, they must criticize from a higher standpoint, so as to master a large amount of objective evidence, avoid subjective consciousness, and do not use their limited intelligence as a yardstick.
When criticizing, stand on a higher footing and make comments, praises, or accusations based on a comprehensive understanding of the situation. This would not arouse people’s disgust, but if you want to use this to elevate yourself, take the gains from a comprehensive understanding of the situation. All the superb opinions are exaggerated into the performance of their own genius, which will definitely be offensive. Although this practice is easy to see through, vanity often tempts people to do so, so this kind of dissatisfaction often happens. More often, the critics did not deliberately brag about themselves, but did not pay attention to precautions. Therefore, some readers mistakenly believe that he is bragging, saying that he does not have the ability to criticize.
Therefore, when a critic points out the mistakes of great figures like Frederick the Great or Napoleon, it does not mean that the critic himself will not make the same mistakes. He may also admit that if he himself is in the position of commander-in-chief, maybe Will make more serious mistakes. I just want to show that the critics discovered these errors based on the connection of things, and those parties, the great commanders, could have used their own wisdom to avoid these errors.
The above method is based on the connection of things and the judgment made with reference to the result. If a simple result can prove whether a certain measure is correct or not, then the result will have a completely different effect on judgment. We can call this judgment a judgment based on the result. At first glance, this judgment seems to be of little value, but the actual situation is not the case.
Just as Napoleon forced Emperor Alexander to make peace after the Battle of Friedland in 1807, and in 1805 and 1809, Napoleon forced Emperor Franz to make peace after the Battle of Austerlitz and Wagram, Napoleon attacked Moscow in 1812. At that time, everything depends entirely on whether the occupation of Moscow and the glorious record of the past can prompt Emperor Alexander to make peace. Because, if he can't force Alexander to make peace in Moscow, then he has only the option of withdrawing troops, which means that he will be defeated strategically. Here, we don’t want to discuss what measures Napoleon took to reach Moscow, whether he has lost many opportunities that prompted Emperor Alexander to make up his mind to make peace, and we don’t discuss how embarrassed Napoleon was during the retreat; in fact, even in the process of marching into Moscow. Napoleon’s brilliant results are not entirely certain that Emperor Alexander will reconcile out of fear; even if the casualties during the retreat were not so heavy, it was ultimately a major strategic failure. Had Emperor Alexander signed an unequal contract in 1812, the battle would be comparable to the battles of Austerlitz, Friedland, and Wagram. On the contrary, if no contract was signed in these few battles, then Napoleon might suffer a disastrous outcome similar to 1812. Therefore, no matter how hard, witty, and brave this conqueror of the world is, he cannot change the outcome of the war, and the factors that determine the final fate of the war will remain unchanged. People cannot deny the battles of 1805, 1807, and 1809 based on the defeat in the battle of 1812, or even say that these battles were unwise, and their victory was not taken for granted; people cannot take the defeat of 1812 as a matter of course. It is the result of strategically taken for granted, and it is believed that the god of fortune did not play a role. If you hold this view, it is very reluctant, and this judgment is also very arbitrary and unfounded! Because according to the inevitable connection between events, no one can see the determination of the defeated commander.
We cannot say that the battle of 1812 should have achieved the same results as the previous battles. The reason why the same results were not achieved was due to some unreasonable factors, because Alexander’s stubborn resistance was not unreasonable. of.
It is reasonable to say that Napoleon’s judgment on the enemy’s situation in 1805, 1807, and 1809 was correct, but he made a mistake in his judgment of 1812. In the previous wars, his strategy was correct. , But in 1812 he made a wrong judgment, which led to war mistakes. The reason why we say this is derived from the results of the war. In other words, the results of the war tell us this way.
As mentioned earlier, the results pursued by all actions in the war are not definite results. Those who cannot be sure of the results have to rely on luck or opportunity to get them. Of course, people have the right to rely on luck as little as possible, but this is only suitable for certain specific situations, that is, in specific situations, you can require as little as possible to rely on luck or opportunity, but this does not mean that the least uncertainty is the occasion the best. If we had to say this, it would be extremely contradictory to our theoretical viewpoints. Because in some occasions, the greater the risk, the more wisdom it shows.
When the party has to succumb to the arrangements of fate, it seems that there is neither any credit nor responsibility for his personal ability. In spite of this, when we see that his goal is achieved, we will not be able to restrain our inner joy, and when we see that his goal has failed, we will unconsciously feel sad for him. Our judgment on the correctness of the behavior of the parties based on the results is a concrete manifestation of our feelings.
It is undeniable that it is precisely because there is a sense of inexplicability that people express excitement when the client’s goals are achieved, and express dissatisfaction when hope fails, as if there is a subtle, unpleasant relationship between the client’s talent and luck. A certain connection that is not easily detectable is the same; moreover, our subconscious mind is very happy to imagine the existence of such a connection. If the person involved often experiences victory or defeat, then our feeling towards him will gradually deepen, and even become a fixed view, which also provides proof for the above insights. It can also be seen that luck or luck is more valuable in war than in gambling. A lucky commander, as long as we don't hurt our goodwill towards him in other ways, then we are willing to examine his deeds and at the same time be willing to accept fate's care for him.
Therefore, when criticizing, after all human intelligence can speculate and argue, those mysterious connections hidden in things that are not manifested through obvious phenomena can only be explained through results. On the one hand, critics must support these judgments based on the results, so that they will not be tortured by those rough opinions, and on the other hand, they must take care to avoid abuse of such judgments.
Those whose intelligence cannot be determined can only be inferred based on the results. This kind of judgment is mainly used when determining mental power and its function. The reason is that it is difficult for intelligence to make reliable judgments on them. On the other hand, they are closely related to human will and can easily control human will. . If determination is swayed by fear or courage, no other objective reason can be found between them and determination. Therefore, when judging a possible result with wisdom and reasoning, there is no concrete basis as a basis.
Let us now examine the tool of criticism, that is, the language used in criticism, because the language used in criticism is consistent with the actions in war. Criticism is actually a kind of thinking, which is the same as the thinking made before the action. Therefore, we believe that the language used in the criticism has the same characteristics as the thinking in the war. This is very important, otherwise, it will lose its practical significance and will no longer be a bridge for criticism to reality.
As mentioned earlier, theory should not become a rigid clause that hinders the performance of commanders, but should be a tool for cultivating their intellectual activities, or more accurately, to play a guiding role in the training process. If it is said that when judging a specific situation in war, it is not allowed or unnecessary to use auxiliary lines like geometric mathematics; if it is said that truth is not expressed in the form of a system here; if it is said that truth can only be discovered directly by insight, Rather than discovering indirectly, it should be the same in critical investigations.