Art of War Collection

Chapter 43: Introduction to War (1)

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strategy

In order to achieve the purpose of war, the use of combat is strategy. This concept has been determined in the second section of chapter two. Strategy was originally only related to combat, but strategic theory must study the army itself and the main issues related to the army at the same time, because combat first affects the army and is carried out by the army. As far as the battle itself is concerned, strategic theory studies the results obtained, as well as the intellectual and emotional powers that play an important role in the battle.

Strategy is the use of combat. Therefore, strategy must determine a war-adapted goal for the entire military operation, that is, formulate a combat plan; the plans and deployment plans of each battle situation must link the actions to achieve this goal with this goal. , All of this must be established based on expectations that are not completely consistent with the actual situation, and the details cannot be specified in advance. Therefore, it is obvious that the strategy should go deep into the battlefield, deal with various issues according to the situation at the time, and modify the overall plan at any time. Therefore, the strategy must continue to operate at all times.

On this point, people don't always think so, but in general it is. In the past, strategy was generally controlled by the cabinet rather than the military. However, it is appropriate to do so only when the cabinet is very close to the army and can be regarded as the base camp of the army.

When formulating a plan, the theory will serve the strategy. To be more precise, the theory will explain the interaction between things and highlight certain things as principles or rules.

Recalling the first chapter, the various issues involved in the war, you can understand that unless you have extraordinary insight, you cannot consider the issues in a more comprehensive manner.

If a monarch or commander-in-chief is good at achieving his goals by various means and doing just the right thing, then he is a genius. However, this talent is manifested in the final victory of the entire war, not in the eye-catching, novel and unique actions. What is commendable is that in the final results, we see that the assumptions he made are so realistic, so coordinated and orderly.

If the researcher does not see this coordination in the final results, he will waste time searching for geniuses where there is no or impossible to produce them.

Because strategies are often used repeatedly and are familiar to people, and the methods and methods are very simple, people with common sense will feel very funny when they hear some commentators talk about them exaggeratedly. For example: the circuitous action that has been used repeatedly is praised here as a performance of outstanding genius, and there is praised as a performance of the most thorough insight, and it is even said to be a kind of performance. In addition to the performance of profound knowledge, there will be no more ridiculous strange theory than this in the world.

It must be pointed out that in the most vulgar view, these commentators exclude all spiritual factors from the theory and discuss only the material factors, so that everything is limited to advantages and balance of power, time and space, a few angles and a few lines. Relationship. If there are only these, I am afraid that even a mathematics problem for elementary school students will not be able to do it.

In our opinion, this has nothing to do with scientific formulas and math learning problems. In fact, the connection of material things is relatively simple. The difficulty is how to grasp the important spiritual force. However, spiritual power only appears in the highest range of strategy, that is, strategy is close to politics and state governance, and even when it is combined with them, will it appear intricate and make their types and relationships become diverse and endless. As we have said before, their impact on the mode of military operations is relatively small, while their impact on the scale of military operations is relatively large. In places where the mode of action is dominant, such as various specific actions in war, the influence of its spiritual power is reduced.

Because of this, everything seems to be simple strategically, but this does not mean it is easy to do. As long as you understand all aspects of the country and determine the war plan, such as what can be done, it is easy to find a way to war. However, if you want to follow this path unremittingly and carry on with the plan, and never waver for a thousand reasons, then not only must you have a very strong perseverance, but also an extremely clear mind and firmness. Faith. Therefore, among thousands of outstanding people, some may be known for their superior wisdom, some may be known for their keen insight, and some may be outstanding for their courage or strong will, but none of the above-mentioned advantages may be able to achieve all of them. Possess, thus become outstanding commander in chief.

Compared with tactics, making important decisions in strategy requires stronger willpower. This sounds strange, but anyone who knows some war situations will never doubt it. In terms of tactics, the situation is always changing, and the speed of change is very fast. The commander is like being caught in a whirlpool, he can only risk his life to fight with it, and he has to overcome the doubts caused by too many changes and be brave. To advance towards the goal. Strategically, the situation changes relatively slowly, and the doubts, objections and opinions of oneself or others, and even some untimely annoyances will have a greater effect. In tactics, most situations are seen by people with their own eyes. In strategy, everything must rely on intelligence and speculation. Relatively speaking, confidence is relatively small. As a result, many generals are often unconsciously hindered by wrong doubts in their actions.

Let us now look back at history and take a look at the battle of Frederick the Great in 1760. This is a battle known for excellent marching and maneuvering. It has been praised by critics and praised as a true masterpiece of strategy. Could it be his flexible tactics that make us admire the five-body shooting? Should we regard this tactic as a performance of wisdom and superiority? No, if we want to judge the problem truthfully, we cannot think so. First of all, what we should appreciate is his wisdom. When he pursues a goal, he never does things beyond his ability, but uses limited power to take actions that are sufficient to reach the goal. In addition to seeing the great king's invincible wisdom in this battle, it can also be seen in all three battles.

Signing a contract to ensure the possession of Silesia was his goal at the time.

As the head of a small country, he cannot be an Alexander. If he wants to imitate Charlie XII, he will also end up shattered. From all the wars he fought, we can see that he possesses a kind of ability, that is, he is very restrained in the use of power; he is not lacking in momentum and can always remain calm. In very urgent moments, he can make power Played to an astonishing level; later, in order to comply with the small changes in politics, he was able to maintain a steady state of mind. Whether it is vanity, honor, or vengeance, he cannot leave this path, and it is precisely because of this path that leads him to the final victory of the struggle.

The above few words cannot properly evaluate the achievements of this great commander in this regard! Only by carefully analyzing the astonishing victory in this war and exploring the reasons for this victory can people learn from it that it is precisely because of his keen judgment that he bypassed all the reefs and moved forward smoothly. .

This is the main aspect of our admiration for this great commander. This was demonstrated in the battle of 1760 and in other battles. It was particularly prominent in the battle of 1760, because unlike other battles, this battle was only a very small price. The dominant enemy maintained a balance of power.

There is another aspect that makes us admire, that is, in actual combat, he has overcome the difficulties that arise anytime and anywhere. It's easy to think of this way of detouring the enemy from the left or right. It is also easy to think of concentrating your limited forces in order to fight against scattered enemies at any time, and use swift action to give full play to your limited strength. The above is not worthy of our admiration, because it couldn't be simpler, there is nothing left to talk about.

But let a commander like Frederick the Great and try these again! Many writers who have seen all of this, after a long time, said that his camping was dangerous and frivolous. We never doubt that when he set up camping, the danger was very great, even two or three times bigger than it seemed with hindsight.

The reason why Frederick the Great dared to march in front of the enemy's eyes, and even marched at the enemy’s gun, was because he learned from Dawn’s sense of responsibility and personality, as well as Dawn’s handling of problems and the method of deploying troops. He found a basis in this. The reason why he was able to do this without being intimidated by the dangers that everyone was talking about thirty years later was because he was brave, decisive, and strong-willed. At that time, in addition to Frederick the Great, how many commanders would believe that such a simple strategy would be so effective

There are still difficulties in the specific implementation: in this battle, the army of Frederick the Great is constantly moving. It has followed Daun twice under the condition of being tracked by Lassi, and marched along the difficult road from the Elbe to Silesia. The army must be ready for battle at all times. Because the march must be carried out cleverly and concealedly, the fatigue and risk that the army has to endure are extremely great. Although there are thousands of heavy trucks accompanying them and bringing difficulties to the march, the army is still very scarce. In Silesia, before the Battle of Lignitz, the army had to march at night for eight consecutive days, tossing and turning in front of enemy positions, which required the army to endure extraordinary fatigue and hardship.

Wouldn't this bring huge resistance to the army? Could the commander use his wisdom to dispatch the army as easily as the surveyor turns the altimeter by hand? When the Führer and the Supreme Commander see the exhausted look of the poor brothers who are hungry and thirsty, can they not feel bad? Could the various rumors arising from this not be passed into his ears? Can any ordinary person have the courage to make such a request? If it weren’t for the incomparable trust in the commander-in-chief, then this cruel fatigue would inevitably lead to a low morale and a loosening of discipline. Simply put, isn’t this just about destroying the military’s morality? It is these miracles in actual action that we should respect and admire. However, you will only fully appreciate these if you have experienced it yourself. Those who only learn about war from textbooks and on the exercise grounds absolutely cannot understand this. Therefore, I hope they will sincerely accept from us what they cannot get from experience!

These examples above clearly illustrate our thinking. At the end of this section, let us briefly explain that when discussing strategy, whether it is material or spiritual, we must first clarify those strategic factors that we think are the most important. The method is to talk about some parts first, and then talk about them. As a whole, it ends with the connection of the entire military activity.

The deployment of an army at a certain location does not mean that there will be a battle here, only that there is a possibility of battle. Can this possibility be regarded as a practical thing? of course can. As long as there is an effect on the possibility of combat, no matter what the effect is, it can be regarded as an actual thing.

The possibility of fighting should be regarded as an actual battle because of its effects. If troops are sent to intercept the enemy’s escape route, the enemy surrenders without fighting. This shows that it is precisely because the troops we sent are already prepared. Fighting with the enemy forced the enemy to make a decision to surrender.

If an undefended area of the enemy is occupied by a certain part of our army, which destroys the enemy’s large number of supplementary forces, then the reason why our army can occupy this area is because the troops we sent have indirectly told the enemy: if They are ready to retake the area occupied by our army, and the two sides are bound to fight.

In the two situations mentioned above, there is only the possibility of fighting, and the effect has already been produced. Therefore, this possibility has produced actual things. Suppose the enemy fights against our army with superior forces in these two situations, trying to make our army abandon its original purpose without going through battle. Then even if we did not achieve the expected goal, the battle we originally planned to carry out here is not. It is not ineffective, because it attracts enemy forces. Even if we lose in the entire operation, we cannot say that the possible battles and deployments are ineffective. This only means that the effect is the same as a failed battle.

Therefore, the effect of annihilating and destroying an enemy force can only be achieved through combat, regardless of whether the battle has already been carried out or has just been deployed and the opponent has not challenged.

The dual purpose of fighting

The effects of combat are dual, direct and indirect. If fighting is to achieve one's own goals through other activities, rather than directly aiming at destroying the enemy, then the effect of this kind of battle is indirect. If the direct purpose of the battle is to occupy a certain area, city, fortress, or roads, bridges, or warehouses, then these activities are by no means his ultimate goal. This is just a means to gain a greater advantage, the purpose is to fight the enemy when he is unable to fight. Therefore, they can only be regarded as intermediate links, as a ladder leading to effective elements, and must not be regarded as effective elements themselves.

Instance

Napoleon’s capital was occupied in 1814, and the purpose of the war was achieved. The political disintegration that began in Paris had an effect, and the emperor's power tended to collapse in the split. However, these need to be analyzed from the following point of view: the political collapse accelerated the weakening of Napoleon’s military strength and resistance, so the advantages of the coalition forces naturally increased, and Napoleon was unable to resist any more. Therefore, the coalition forces and France only had it. May make peace. If at that time the strength of the coalition forces was similarly weakened due to external factors and lost their advantage, then the importance of occupying Paris and all the effects would be impossible.

We have conducted a series of discussions on the above in order to point out that these concepts are very important, because these concepts are the only real and natural understanding of the development of things. With this understanding, people will often think: in wars, in different battles that occur at each moment, what kind of effects will the enemy and ours have? Only when these are taken into consideration can we have a clear direction when formulating a war situation plan or a war plan, and know what measures should be taken.

If you don’t look at the problem in this way, you will make a wrong evaluation of other activities. If you are not used to seeing war or the situation in a war as interconnected chains, if you think that occupying certain places has some value in itself, then , People will regard such an occupation as a very easy result. If we look at the problem in this way, people will not consider: Is such an occupation bad for the future? In the history of war, such mistakes are not uncommon! We can be sure: in a war, a certain victory cannot be excluded from the overall result, just like a businessman cannot store the profits of a certain transaction, he must put all his wealth into the transaction. Therefore, in a war, only the final outcome can finally determine the gains and losses of previous actions.

If a commander concentrates all his wisdom on the whole process of the battle from beginning to end, then he is advancing toward the goal. In this way, the battle maintains an appropriate strength that is not affected by the outside world. In other words, willingness and Action also has an appropriate impetus that is not affected by external influences.

Strategic elements

We divide the strategic elements that determine how to use combat into five categories: mental elements, material elements, mathematical elements, geographic elements, and statistical elements.