There is another fact that can prove this point. Some commentators believe that the military should have an ideal fixed standard number of troops to be invested. Once this number is exceeded, not only will it not bring benefits, but it will be cumbersome.
Finally, there are many examples to prove that the reason why people did not put all the available forces into the war was because they did not believe that the superiority of forces in numbers would play a decisive role in the entire battle.
If people believe that concentration of forces is very important, and that this advantage can achieve everything they want, then this belief will definitely be reflected in the preparations for war, and they will definitely put as much force as possible into the war. In order to ensure their superiority in military strength, at least not to allow the enemy to gain an advantage in this regard. Let's talk about the issue of the number of troops in the war.
The number of absolute forces is regulated by the government. This kind of regulation is a very important strategic issue in military activities. However, in most cases, the commander in command of the war must regard the number of absolute forces as a predetermined number, because the commander Perhaps he did not participate in the discussion about how much troops should be invested, or perhaps the conditions could not be met to expand his troops to a sufficient extent.
Therefore, in the face of this situation, even if it cannot take advantage of the number of troops, it is necessary to use the army cleverly in order to use favorable conditions in decisive places to create a relative advantage.
Because of this, the calculation of space and time has become more important, so people began to re-examine this strategic calculation. They believed that it seemed to include all the problems of the correct use of the army; some people even believed that an outstanding commander was born. It should have this kind of calculation skills in strategy and tactics.
No matter what the occasion, the calculation of space and time is the most basic. Strategically, it is absolutely indispensable, but it is not the most difficult and decisive.
If we read the history of war objectively, we will definitely find that such incidents that cause heavy losses due to calculation errors are at least strategically rare. If a flexible and decisive military commander leads an army to defeat several enemies quickly and violently, and also uses the ingenious combination of space and time to calculate and explain, then we will only use it in vain. The words are entangled. In order to make the concept clear and useful, various things must be called with accurate and appropriate names.
When Frederick the Great and Napoleon made accurate judgments on the enemy's situation, they dared to maintain a confrontational and adventurous spirit with each other for a period of time with very little force. The reason for their victory in the end is that they have a kind of perseverance to march, a kind of courage to make a surprise attack, and a kind of calmness that a great man can show when facing danger. What does all this have to do with the calculation of space and time?
However, like after the victory of Rothbach and Monmirai, they took advantage of the momentum to win Leden and Montero by rebounding troops. This method is usually trusted by great commanders in defensive battles, to be precise After all, it is only an extremely rare phenomenon in history.
In order to gain a relative advantage, that is, to skillfully concentrate excellent troops on decisive locations, first of all, you should accurately choose the decisive location, so that your army has a correct direction from the beginning; secondly, you must have the ability to serve the main interests. The spirit of being able to sacrifice secondary interests. In this regard, Frederick the Great and Napoleon did very well.
We believe that after what has been discussed above, the importance of quantitative advantages has been clarified. We must regard quantitative advantage as the most basic principle, and the first thing we must strive for is quantitative advantage no matter where we are.
However, if the superiority of the number of troops is therefore used as an indispensable condition for victory, then our point of view will be completely misunderstood. What we want to point out is the importance of the number of troops in combat. As long as you can do your utmost to concentrate your forces, then this principle is completely in line with this principle; as to whether you should consider whether you should fight when the forces are insufficient, it can only be decided based on the prevailing circumstances.
Surprise
In order to achieve the advantages mentioned in the previous section as much as possible, then we should strive to avoid the enemy everywhere. Obviously, all actions should be based on surprise, because only it can achieve victory, otherwise it would be unimaginable to gain an advantage in a decisive location.
Because of this, surprise is a means to gain advantage; in addition, in terms of its spiritual effects, it can also be regarded as an independent factor. Successful surprises will cause chaos to the enemy and loss of fighting spirit. In this way, you can take advantage of the victory and pursue, and the results will be doubled. There are many battles to prove this. The surprise attack mentioned here is not in the narrow sense--surprise attack within the scope of the offensive—but a surprise attack in the broad sense, using various measures, especially the method of adjusting forces to achieve surprise. Surprise can be used in defense, and it is more important in tactical defense.
We believe that surprise is the basis of all actions, but the nature of the action and the conditions of the action are not the same, so the degree of the basis for the surprise is of course different.
This difference is due to differences in the characteristics of the army, commander-in-chief and even the government.
The two factors of surprise are secrecy and swiftness, both of which depend on the great courage of the government and commander, and the seriousness of the army. Weakness and slackness can never achieve surprise. Although we should fight for the enemy under any circumstances, it is not only indispensable, but also achieves a certain effect; however, there are not many successful surprises in the history of war. This is due to it. Determined by nature. Therefore, it would be a big mistake to think that victory can be achieved only by means of surprise. In people's minds, it is often thought that being surprised is often fascinating, but in fact, being surprised for various reasons is very difficult to achieve.
In terms of tactics, because the scope of time and space involved is relatively small, it is often easier to achieve by surprise. Therefore, in terms of strategy, the closer the measures are to the tactical scope, the more chances of surprise; and the closer the measures to the political scope, the fewer chances of surprise.
It usually takes several months to prepare for a war. To gather the army and move to a certain place, you first need to build some warehouses, and you also need a large-scale march of troops. This series of actions are often discovered by the enemy.
Therefore, when a country wants to attack another country unexpectedly, or deliberately transfer a large number of troops to another country unexpectedly, this kind of battle is very rare. In the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the main strategic method was siege. People once wanted to adopt unexpected tactics to siege fortresses. They believed that this was a vital part of military art. However, successful battles were very successful. less.
On the contrary, if the activities that can be completed in a short period of time are more likely to be won by unexpected tactics. Therefore, it is often not difficult to get to the battle site in front of the enemy, or to occupy an important fortress or road first. Obviously, this kind of surprise is easy to do, but the effect is very poor; on the contrary, although it is difficult to do, the effect is very good. If someone believes that small-scale surprises can achieve results, such as winning a major battle and seizing an important warehouse, then it means that he believes in things that do not exist in history and cannot be proved at all, because this An example of a small-scale surprise that has achieved a large effect is rare. Therefore, it can be proved that it is idiotic and difficult to use small-scale surprises to get big results.
Obviously, those who study these issues from historical examples should not only focus on the gorgeous rhetoric and self-righteous terminology of the critics, but should focus on the facts themselves. For example, in the battle in Silesia, on July 22, 1761, there was an incident that was famous for unexpected surprises. When Frederick the Great marched towards Northen near Nice, he was one step ahead of General Laudon, so that the Austrian and Russian troops did not meet in Silesia. Therefore, Frederick the Great won four weeks to prepare for the war. However, if you read carefully the records of this event by historians, it is not difficult to see that the action on July 22 is actually unreasonable. Nowadays, how can people who desire to know the truth tolerate legends that go against the facts
If in the course of the war, if you want to use surprise to achieve great results, you must be flexible and swift to decide plans and carry out forced marches. In this regard, Frederick the Great and Napoleon were recognized as genius conductors. However, we can also see from their battle examples that even if they have made adequate preparations, they have not always achieved the expected results. In July 1760, Frederick the Great unexpectedly attacked General Lassi, and then attacked Dresden, but in fact he not only gained nothing during the entire battle, but lost the secondary fortress of Gera. In order to put their troops in a more disadvantaged position.
In 1813, Napoleon suddenly attacked Blücher twice, but these two times failed to achieve the expected results. Instead, the troops rushed out. Not only wasted time and strength, but also put Dresden in a very dangerous situation. situation.
Therefore, in order to achieve great results in a war by unexpected means, the courage, courage, and decisiveness of the commander alone is not enough. Other favorable conditions must also be met. Here, we do not want to blindly deny the huge effects that may be brought about by surprise, but think that the effects are inseparable from other favorable external conditions, and these conditions do not exist at all times, and the commander cannot do whatever he wants. To create it.
On this point, Frederick the Great and Napoleon also provide us with two other examples. In 1814, when Blücher left the main army and led the army to the lower reaches of the Marne, Napoleon launched a very famous raid on it. They carried out a two-day rapid march to destroy Blücher’s army. This was completely Unexpected effect. Because if Blücher expected Napoleon to attack him, he would not organize this operation at all. The results of this unexpected surprise attack are inseparable from Blücher's wrong judgment. At that time, Napoleon was not fully aware of the opponent's situation. Therefore, although his battle was successful, it was mixed with a lucky chance.
The Battle of Lignitz in 1760 was also an occasional battle. In this battle, Frederick the Great won a brilliant victory. After just occupying a position, he moved overnight. This action was unexpected by Lao Dong, so that Lao Dong lost 70 cannons and 10,000 soldiers. Although Frederick the Great often used the tactics of violent attacks, the night shift on the 14th was not for this reason, but as he himself said, because he did not like the position occupied on the 14th. Perhaps it was just a disturbance. A strategy of the enemy. Therefore, contingency also plays a big role in this example. If it weren't for Frederick the Great's transfer at night, if it weren't for the complicated terrain, the result of Laodong's attack might not have been like this.
Of course, in the higher or highest strategic range, there have also been some cases of using unexpected tactics to achieve great results. In order to prove this point, we specifically cite the following examples of battles: One was in 1757, when the Grand Elector fought the Swedes, from Franken to Pomeranian, from Mark to Pule Gore. An offensive; one was in 1800, when Napoleon led his troops across the Alps. In the case of 1800, the army surrendered the entire area; in the case of 1757, the army also surrendered the entire theater after surrender. Finally, we can also cite the case of Frederick the Great’s invasion of Silesia, which was also an unexpected case. In the above examples, great results have been achieved. However, this situation is also caused by the lack of athleticism and perseverance in the same country as a whole, and insufficient preparations for war. Regardless of these factors, this situation is rarely seen in the history of war.
Let's talk about a key issue about unexpectedness: Only those who can influence the other side can be unexpected; and only those who act correctly can influence and dominate the other side. If the wrong method is used in order to surprise the enemy, not only will it fail to obtain good results, but will lead to unexpected evil results. At least the enemy does not need to worry about our measures. He can learn from our lessons and find countermeasures to prevent misfortune. . Offense has more enthusiasm than defense. Therefore, most attackers use surprise. As we will talk about later, it is not absolute. It is also possible that the attacker and the defender simultaneously adopt unexpected combat methods. At this time, it depends on whose measures are the most appropriate, who can gain the advantage.
Although this is the reason, it is not strictly abided by this criterion in actual actions, and the reason is not complicated. The mental effect of surprise can often turn bad things into good things. This makes the opponent unable to perform normally. This not only refers to the opponent’s senior commanders, but also includes commanders of different levels, because surprise will cause the troops to fall apart. , So the personality of each commander will be expressed to varying degrees.
It should be said that most of the problems depend on the comparison of the overall situation of the two parties. If you have an advantage in the whole spirit, can lower the morale of the opponent, cause them to panic and be at a loss, then the use of hostility at this time will achieve unexpected results, and even battles that should have failed will also achieve good results. .
Deceit
Deception presupposes an attempt to hide oneself, so it runs counter to bluntness, that is, it is opposed to direct action, just like puns and direct confession are opposed to each other. Therefore, it is not the same as persuasion, bribery, and persecution. It is quite similar to deception, because deception also presupposes an attempt to conceal oneself. If deceit succeeds completely, it is a deception in itself, but on the surface it is not straightforward and unbelievable, so it is different from the so-called deception in general. Those who use deceit want to make the deceived person make intellectual mistakes, and what they want to achieve is to make him blind to the truth of things. From this point of view, if puns are juggling each other in thought and concept, then deception is juggling in action.
We can think that the name strategy seems to be derived from the word deceit, and it is not unreasonable to say this. Although since the Greek era, although war has undergone various changes in many aspects, the name strategy still seems to have a deceitful nature.
If you admit that tactics are the implementation of violent acts, and regard strategy as an art of commanding battles, apart from various emotional factors, it seems that other endowments cannot guide and encourage strategic actions like deceit. The unexpected surprise mentioned in the previous section already contains this meaning, because no matter what the unexpected surprise is, it is based on deceit.
Even if it is necessary for us to understand how the commanders of the two sides competed in cunning, tact and deceit in the war, there is very little record of these contents in the history of war, and the relationship and situation between each other are also very limited. It is rarely explained.
Obviously, the reason for the above situation is roughly the same as that discussed in the previous section.