Strategy is different from other activities in that it only takes measures related to the deployment of combat. Strategy is different from life. It can be carried out in oral and written activities, such as making a conversation or drafting a statement. However, when using deceit to deceive, these are the most basic things to be used.
There are similar activities in the war. For example, revealing false plans and orders to the enemy to deceive the other's trust, or deliberately leaking false information to the enemy, etc. However, these practices usually only play a general role within the strategic scope, and only on some special occasions can they achieve a multiplier effect with half the effort. Therefore, the commander cannot take this approach at will.
However, in order to deceive the enemy through routine activities such as combat deployment, it takes a lot of time, energy, and force. The larger the scale of the activity, the more it has to pay. Under normal circumstances, people are unwilling to pay this price for this, so the so-called feint is not strategically effective. In fact, it is very dangerous to allow a large number of troops to pretend to deceive the opponent for a long time. This may not be very effective, and these troops cannot function normally in decisive locations, so most of the gains will not be worth the loss.
Commanders should be able to understand this simple truth deeply, so they don't like this cunning and treacherous trick. The reality does not allow the commander to play false tricks, he can only take direct and decisive actions. In short, there can be no such flexibility as treacherous and cunning on the chessboard of the entire strategy.
All in all, deceit does not hinder the necessary emotional power-often nuisance-the operation of which will not do much harm; but for a commander, accurate and decisive judgment is more important and more important than deceit. For useful.
But one thing we need to understand is that when the strategic control of the fewer forces, the more deceit needs to be used. Therefore, when the military strength is not ideal, caution and wisdom are of no avail. This makes any method seem powerless, and deceit becomes the most important means. The more desperate people are, the more they want to make a desperate move, but only deceit can help them increase their courage. When life and death are ignored, and no consequences are considered, tricks and courage can interact at this time, and the faint light of hope can be concentrated at one point, and perhaps a light that causes flames may be formed.
Concentration of forces in space
The best strategy should first be in terms of total force, and always maintain a very strong army in decisive locations. Therefore, in addition to trying to expand forces, the most important and simplest strategic criterion is to effectively concentrate limited forces. Unless there is a special task that requires the deployment of troops, no troops should be separated from the main force. We must strictly abide by this rule and use it as a guide for war action. As for the reasonable reasons for the division of forces, we will surely understand it gradually. At the same time, we will also see that not every war has the same effect as the above-mentioned criteria. Because the purpose and means of war are different, the effects produced are also different.
Often some people just mechanically divide or disperse their forces according to other people's customary practices, but don't know the real purpose of doing so. This kind of situation sounds unbelievable, but it did happen and it happened many times.
If we admit that the concentration of forces is a criterion, it is meaningless to disperse or divide forces. Only when certain conditions are met can it be implemented. Therefore, we can completely avoid those stupid behaviors, and we can also eliminate all kinds of absurd reasons for dividing forces.
Concentration of forces in time
The concepts to be discussed here can easily cause various illusions in the actual application process. Therefore, it is necessary to re-determine some concepts, so we will make a simple analysis again.
War is the collision of two forces in different directions. From this, it is concluded that the stronger party can not only offset the other party, but also force the other party to change its original direction. Therefore, in a war, the power must not be used separately. At the same time, it should be clearly stipulated that all the power used in a collision is a basic law that must be observed.
However, the above phenomenon can only occur when the war collides mechanically like a machine. If in the war, the forces of both sides continue to interact, then they can continue to play the role of force. This is the case in tactics, mainly because firepower is the most important basis in tactics, and of course there are other reasons. If one thousand people are used against five hundred people in a firepower battle, then the casualties of both sides are directly related to the number of people who participated in the battle. One thousand people fired twice as many bullets as five hundred people, and the probability of one thousand people being hit is also greater than the probability of being hit by five hundred people, (because the formation of one thousand people is compared with that of five hundred people. The formation is much denser). Assuming that one thousand people are twice as likely to be hit as five hundred people, then the casualties on both sides are the same. This is like the death of two hundred people in the battle with five hundred people, and the casualties of the one with 1,000 people are relatively the same as the former. If there are 500 people on the side fighting with 500 people who are not within the firepower, then both sides still have 800 people who can participate in the battle. However, it is important to know that 500 of the 800 people on one side are not only well-equipped with ammunition and physical strength, but the 800 on the other side are all soldiers with insufficient ammunition, weakened physical strength, and low morale. However, just because one thousand people are twice as many as five hundred people, it is said that it is twice as likely to be hit. This assumption is incorrect. Therefore, the side that retains half of its forces may be hit by the powerful forces of the other side at the beginning of the war, and thus suffer greater losses. At the same time, it should also be admitted that, under normal circumstances, the party that puts in a thousand-strength battle has the initiative from the beginning: driving the opponent out of the stronghold or forcing the enemy to retreat. However, after that, the side that devoted more troops to the battle had only 800 soldiers who had participated in the battle and were in a state of relaxation, while the other side had 500 soldiers with sufficient physical strength. Even if the soldiers who participated in the battle, the degree of combat effectiveness was weakened. It is not very serious, which is disadvantageous for it. As to whether the above two favorable conditions can be offset by this one disadvantage, this cannot be made clear by further analysis of the problem, and it must be determined by future experience. Here, anyone with a little war experience will think that under normal circumstances, the advantage lies in the side with strong fighting spirit.
In summary, the side that uses too much force in battle will have many disadvantages. Although there may be great benefits in using superior forces at the beginning, they have to pay a considerable price in the future.
Of course, the above-mentioned dangerous situation can only occur when the army is in chaos, loose formation, and physically weak, that is, when there is a crisis in the battle. Therefore, when one side's army is in a disadvantageous state, the other side's considerable number of troops will play a decisive role.
When the loose state of the victorious party gradually disappears and only the spiritual advantage brought by the joy of victory is left, it will not be easy for the other party to invest in the new force to restore the defeat; on the contrary, the new force will also be involved in the defeat. In the whirlpool. It is impossible for an army that has just been defeated by the opponent to turn defeat into victory by relying on a strong reserve force the next day. From here we can see that there is a very important difference between tactics and strategy.
Tactical results refer to the results achieved during or before the end of the battle. Most of the results are achieved when the army is loose or physically weak; while the strategic results refer to the results of the overall battle or the final outcome of the battle. The victory, regardless of whether the result is big or small, was not achieved under the circumstances mentioned above. The strategic results are produced when the results of the various parts of the battle are combined to form an independent whole. At this time, there is no crisis, and the army is restored to its original state, and only the part that was actually eliminated is lost.
Based on the above differences, we can draw the conclusion that in tactics, the invested forces can be used successively; while in strategy, the invested forces can only be used at the same time.
In terms of tactics, if the results achieved in the previous stage cannot solve the problem, and the next stage must be considered, then it is natural to know that in order to succeed at the beginning, only the necessary forces can be invested, and the rest must be used. Troops are arranged outside the range of the battlefield so that they can be used to deal with the enemy's reserve army, or to strike against defeated skirmishers who are about to fail. This is different from strategy. On the one hand, as we said above, once you have achieved strategic results, don’t worry about the enemy’s counterattack, because the emergence of strategic results means that the crisis has passed; on the other hand, it does not mean that strategically. The forces used will be weakened. Only the part of the force that tactically engages in face-to-face conflict with the enemy, that is, the part of the force that is engaged in combat, will be weakened by the enemy. In other words, as long as you do not blindly abuse your forces in tactics, then only the part that must be weakened will be weakened, not all the troops participating in the battle. When the military strength is dominant, those troops that have not participated in the battle very much or have not participated in the battle, their existence is enough to play a decisive role together with the participating forces. When the battle is over, these troops still maintain their original state, just like the troops that have not yet participated in the battle, and these troops can be used for new purposes. It is very clear how much these forces used to create superiority will contribute to the final result. And precisely because of such troops, the loss of that part of the troops participating in the war will be greatly reduced.
If the forces used are increased strategically, the losses will not only not increase, but will often decrease, so that our decisive battles will have more guarantees. Then, it can naturally be concluded that the more troops strategically put into war, the better, so all troops must be put into battle.
In addition, we must further demonstrate this principle. Up to now, what we have talked about has only included the struggle itself. Although the struggle is a real military activity, the people, time and space necessary for the struggle, as well as the effects they can produce, should all be considered.
Human fatigue, exhaustion, and lack of materials in war are a special bad factor. This factor does not actually belong to the war itself, but it is more or less directly related to the war, especially closely related to strategy. In terms of tactics, there are often undesirable factors such as army fatigue and shortage of supplies, and these undesirable factors may be serious, but the duration of tactical operations is not long, so we don’t have to do anything about the impact it brings. Many considerations. But strategically, the scope of time and space is relatively large, so the impact of these factors is often very obvious, and often plays a decisive role. In an ever-victorious army, injuries and losses are often much larger than combat losses. Therefore, this phenomenon cannot be ignored.
If we examine this strategic consumption like the tactical firepower warfare and hand-to-hand warfare mentioned above, then one can imagine that any army within the scope of this consumption will have strength at the end of a certain battle situation or a certain strategic stage. Will be weakened to varying degrees, so the forces that have just been put on the battlefield can also play a decisive role. Therefore, strategically, just like tactically, we should invest as little force as possible to obtain the results of the initial stage, so that the new force can be left to play its role in the end.
In order to make an accurate evaluation of this kind of thinking that seems to be reasonable in many practical situations, we must discuss the following issues: First, we must not confuse the forces that were added later with the original forces. . Under normal circumstances, when the battle is coming to an end, whether it is the victor or the loser, they are eager to get the support of troops. They think these seem to have a decisive effect. Let's not talk about this issue here, because if we have a large number of troops from the beginning, there is no need to increase our troops. For new troops, their spiritual value is more worthy of attention than troops that have been fighting for a long time, just as tactical reserve troops are more worthy of attention than troops that have suffered losses in battle. A failed battle will cause the morale and spirit of the troops to be damped to a certain extent, but a victorious battle will increase the morale and spirit of the troops to the same extent, and the gains and losses of the two can offset each other on average. The war exercise kept the valuable things. In addition, we should focus more on winning battles rather than losing battles, because if the probability of failure is expected to be relatively high, then it is even more unlikely that the original force will be insufficient. Part of the force is reserved for future use.
Secondly, there is another question to consider: Will the losses of the army due to fatigue and lack of materials also increase with the increase in its strength? To this question, our answer is no.
Most of the fatigue is caused by danger, and every military action is bound to be dangerous. If the military wants to avoid this danger at all times and implement safe and sure operations, it must conduct a large number of preparatory activities. Preparatory activities include tactical and strategic services. If there is no advantage in military strength, this kind of service will be very onerous, and the greater the advantage in military strength, the more relaxed this kind of service will be. Therefore, in a battle situation, an enemy whose opposing force is less than ours is much less tired than an enemy whose opposing force is equal to or greater than ours.
The above is about the problem of fatigue, and the problem of lack of materials to be discussed below are two different concepts. There are two main aspects to the lack of supplies. One is the lack of supplies; the other is the lack of camping conditions (including shelter and camping). The more troops gather at the same location, the more serious the problems in these two areas will become. However, in terms of expanding outwards, obtaining more space, more supplies, and camping conditions, isn't the superiority in military strength also the best way to win the battle
In 1812, when Napoleon entered Russia in 1812, he concentrated a large number of troops on a large road, which caused an unprecedented shortage of supplies. This is entirely due to his principle: at the decisive place, the more concentrated the troops, the more it is good. We are not here to discuss whether Napoleon overemphasized this principle, but it is certain that if he wants to avoid the problem of lack of materials, he only needs to choose a place with a larger space. The lack of space in Russia generally does not exist. Therefore, we cannot find any reason here to prove that the simultaneous use of superior forces will inevitably lead to a situation in which the army is weakened to a greater extent. Some people may think that: using all the extra troops originally intended to be used when necessary can reduce the burden on the entire army, but the severe weather and fatigue that may occur at any time will also reduce the force. Here we believe that all factors should be connected and a comprehensive investigation and analysis should be carried out. Let me ask, can the disadvantages of downsizing be offset by the benefits of superior forces