There is one more point that needs to be emphasized. In order to achieve a certain greater result in some battles, it is necessary to roughly distinguish which forces should be put into the war and which forces are redundant. It is not difficult to understand these. But it is very difficult to achieve this strategically, because the results that you want to achieve strategically are not rigid, and there are no obvious limits. Therefore, those tactically regarded as redundant forces, but strategically, they should be regarded as means that can be used to take advantage of the opportunity to expand the results of the battle. The size of the benefits increases and decreases with the size of the battle. Therefore, the use of superior forces can easily obtain things that can never be obtained by carefully using forces.
In 1812, Napoleon used his comparative advantage to successfully advance his army to Moscow, and soon occupied the capital. If he immediately used this advantage to completely crush the Russian army, then he might be able to conclude a contract in Moscow that would be difficult to sign even by other means. This example is only used to illustrate the above point, not to prove it. If it is to be proved, it needs to be elaborated in more detail, but it is outdated to do so at present.
The above is for the point of view of the successive use of forces, not for the reserve army itself. Although we have talked about the concept of the reserve team more than once, it is also related to other concepts.
It must be pointed out here that in the tactical range, the extension of the time actually used by the army will lead to the weakening of the army’s strength. Therefore, the length of time is a factor that weakens the army; but in the strategic range, time generally does not affect the army through its own extension Have an impact. Although within the strategic scope, the length of time also has a detrimental effect on the army, part of this depletion effect is offset by the large number of troops, and the other part is compensated by other means. Therefore, we cannot simply use time strategically in an attempt to achieve a situation in which time is beneficial to us through the successive use of forces.
What I am talking about here is purely for time, because through other conditions that time combines with it, the possible or inevitable impact on the combatant is completely different from the direct impact of time itself; the former is not insignificant or indifferent. Yes, we will conduct another study on this issue.
The criterion we want to elaborate is: all forces used for a certain strategic purpose must be used at the same time, and it would be better to be able to concentrate all forces on one action or one moment.
However, within the scope of strategy, there is also the problem of long-term or successive use of force, especially when the new force is the main means to win the final victory, this issue cannot be ignored. This point will be discussed in another chapter, and it is mentioned here just to prevent readers from misunderstanding.
Let us now examine another issue that is closely related to the above discussion, that is, the issue of the strategic reserve team. Only when this point is confirmed can the whole issue be fully explained.
Strategic Reserve
The reserve team has two different missions: one is to extend and resume combat; the other is to deal with unexpected situations. The first mission is based on the premise of successively using forces to obtain benefits, so it will not appear within the scope of the strategy. Sending a troop to a place where it is about to fall is obviously within the scope of the second mission, because the resistance that has to be carried out here is just not fully anticipated. If a force is left behind just to prolong the battle and is arranged outside the firepower range, but still under the command of the commander of the battle, it is obviously a tactical reserve team, not a strategic reserve team.
However, within the strategic scope, it may be necessary to prepare some troops to prevent accidents from happening. Therefore, it may be necessary to prepare a certain strategic reserve team, but this is only done under the conditions of unexpected situations. Within the scope of tactics, most people can only understand the enemy’s measures through observation. Any small forest or depression may hide the enemy’s measures. Therefore, people should always be prepared to prevent accidents from happening. In order to strengthen the weak links in the entire deployment at any time in the future. In short, our military deployment should be adjusted according to the enemy's situation at any time.
This situation must happen within the scope of strategy, because strategic actions are directly related to tactical actions. In terms of strategy, some strategic deployments must also be determined on the basis of daily observations, inaccurate intelligence obtained and actual effects produced during combat. Therefore, because some intelligence is not accurate enough, some troops must be preserved to prevent accidents. This is also in line with strategic needs. We are well aware that in defense, especially in the defense of terrain such as rivers or mountains, this kind of situation must continue to occur. However, when the distance between strategic activities and tactical activities is farther, this inaccuracy will be smaller; when strategic activities are close to the political realm, this inaccuracy almost ceases to exist.
Where the enemy sends troops to fight, this can only be understood through observation and analysis; and where the enemy will cross the river, this can be understood based on the clues revealed by the enemy when he takes preparatory measures. As for where the enemy will invade our country, this is often revealed in all newspapers before the shot is fired. The larger the scale of preparations, the less likely it is for people to be surprised. The time is so long, the space is so big, and the various situations that produce the action are so obvious, but the changes are so small that people have enough time to understand it, or to accurately judge it.
In addition, the more the measures involve the overall situation, the smaller the role of the strategic reserve team, if any, becomes correspondingly. We are well aware that the ending of a partial battle is meaningless in itself, and the value of all partial battles can only be seen in the final ending of the entire battle.
However, even the final outcome of the overall battle has only a relative meaning. The magnitude of their meaning depends entirely on the number of defeated enemy forces in the total strength, and the proportion or production of them. What are the effects. When one legion loses, it can be compensated by the victory of another legion, or even be offset by the victory of a larger legion, and perhaps it can be turned into a victory (such as the victory of Kulm in 1813. The two-day battle is a typical example), which no one can doubt. However, if the defeated part of the enemy is very important, then the importance of victory (victory in the overall battle) will become more and more independent. The enemy wants to recover the defeat through future battles. This possibility is also It becomes smaller, we should be very clear about this. Regarding how to further clarify this point, we will study it in later chapters. At present, it is enough for readers to understand this relationship.
If we say that tactically, the successive use of forces will always postpone decisive actions until the end of the entire battle; strategically putting forces into use according to its criteria, then all the main forces will be carried out at the beginning of the action. Therefore, we can think so based on the above reasons: the broader the mission of the strategic reserve team, the smaller the necessity and the greater the corresponding danger.
When did the existence of the strategic reserve team become unreasonable? It is not difficult to find the answer to this question. The main decisive battle is to divide the boundary of this issue. In the main decisive battle, all troops must be put into battle. It is ridiculous to keep the reserve team composed of part of the army for use after the main battle.
If the tactical reserve team is regarded as a means to deal with accidents, a tactical strategy, and can play a role in redemption in the event of a tactical defeat, then, strategically, in a large-scale decisive battle This method cannot be used. Strategically, a defeat in one place can usually be made up for by a victory in another place; in individual cases, the strength of other places can also be adjusted to save the defeat. However, the practice of pre-reserving troops in order to restore the defeat should never be and will never be allowed.
We believe that the idea of establishing a strategic reserve team to prevent it from participating in the main decisive battle is wrong. This point is already very clear. If it is not hidden by some thought or something, we don't need to use two chapters to analyze it here. Some people praised this as the essence of strategic ingenuity and prudence, while others depreciated it, and even rejected it altogether with all the reserves. This chaotic thinking is often reflected in real life. If people want to know typical examples of this, then we can look back at the defeat in 1806. At that time, the 20,000 people under the command of Prince Eugen of Württemberg were left in Mark by Prussia as a reserve team. As a result, the reserve team failed to reach the Zalle River in time for rescue. In addition, he was still in East Prussia and South Prussia. Twenty-five thousand people were left as a reserve team, ready for future use.
By pointing out these examples, people will not blame us for making up and making things unrealistic.
Reasonable use of forces
As I said before, people's thinking rarely develops in a straight line strictly in accordance with certain principles and rules. There is always room for free movement. In real life, there is also such a law. It is impossible to draw beautiful lines with abscissa and ordinate, and it is also impossible to draw circles and ellipses with algebraic formulas. Therefore, sometimes the commander must have a highly accurate and rapid judgment ability, and have found out the truth without knowing it; sometimes the law should be summarized into clear points to guide people's actions; sometimes the idiom should also be used. Summarize it as a basis for action.
It is necessary to pay attention to let all the troops work. In other words, we must be careful not to waste a single soldier at any time. This is the truth derived from the summary. Whoever arranges too many troops where they are not needed, who cannot put all their troops into battle when the enemy is attacking, that is to say, let a part of the troops fail to play their due role, then whoever is not good at using troops reasonably. In this sense, having but not using is worse than using improperly. If there is a need to fight right away, all the troops should be put into action first, because even if it is not the best fight, it can often contain or defeat a part of the enemy, and completely put aside unnecessary forces, then it is often impossible to get up. Anything. Obviously, this point of view is directly related to the principles set forth in the first three chapters. It is about the same reasoning. We are just demonstrating it from another angle and summing it up into a single concept.
The form of troop allocation--geometric elements
To what extent can geometric elements become an important factor in war? In fortification, we see that geometry dominates almost all problems in the construction process. In tactics, geometry also plays a big role. In the narrow sense of tactics, that is, in the theory of military combat, geometry becomes the basis of combat theory. In field fortifications, including in the doctrine of determining positions and attacking positions, geometric angles and lines dominate like legislators with decision-making power. Here, many geometric elements are abused by people, while others are meaningless. However, in the current war, we are required to adopt encirclement tactics against the enemy. At this time, the geometric elements have once again shown their special role. Nevertheless, compared with modern tactics and fortress warfare, everything in it is not so rigid. Mental strength and personal characteristics, including contingency, play a big role, so geometric elements do not occupy a dominant position in fortress warfare. Within the scope of the strategy, the influence of geometric elements is significantly smaller. Here, although there is a close relationship between the arrangement of forces and the shape of the country, geometric elements are different from architectural techniques. They are not decisive and are not as important as in tactics. As for the way in which these influences are manifested, we can only further clarify them when geometric elements reappear in the future and are worthy of our consideration. Here we just want to let everyone know: it is different in the tactical and strategic scope.
In the tactical range, time and space are always easy to become small. If a force is attacked by the enemy on both the flanks and the back, it will soon be in a situation where there is nowhere to go back. This is a kind of dilemma that can no longer continue to fight. We should find a way to change this situation as soon as possible, or we should consider avoiding this situation before. Therefore, the actions taken at the beginning have a significant effect-the focus is to make the enemy worry about the consequences. Therefore, the geometric form is very important in the arrangement of forces, and it is a very critical factor to avoid the above effects.
But within the strategic scope, the space is very large and the time is very long, so these can only have a small impact. People cannot shoot from one battlefield to another, and it usually takes several weeks or even months to realize a predetermined strategic plan. Moreover, the space is so vast that even if the best measures are worked out, the possibility of achieving the goal accurately and accurately is very small.
Therefore, within the scope of the strategy, this type of action plays a small role, and because of this, the actual victory achieved at a certain location has a large role. If this victory won is not offset by the failure in some places, then it can have sufficient time to play its role. Therefore, we can say with certainty that the number and scale of victory in strategic battles are the most important, while the geometric form of connecting these battles is not important. This is an established truth.
However, in modern theories, the opposite view has become a hot topic of discussion. They believe that with this view, the strategy can play a larger and more important role. They also regard strategy as a high-level intellectual manifestation, believing that this can make war appear more noble, and in fashionable terms, it is to make war more scientific. We believe that the important function of a perfect theory is that it can expose the deceptiveness of fallacy. Since modern theoretical research often starts with the concept of geometric elements, we should emphasize this issue.
Intervals in military operations
If war is seen as an act of confrontation and elimination, then it should be recognized that both sides are advancing. But it should also be admitted that for a certain moment, only one party is moving forward, while the other party is waiting. Because the situation on both sides will never be the same, and it is changing anytime and anywhere. So here at the same time that is good for one party, it will be bad for the other party. Assuming that the commanders of both sides fully understand this, then the basis for one side to advance is also the basis for the other side to wait. Therefore, at the same time, both sides will not both think that going forward is the most beneficial, nor will it think that waiting is more beneficial. Here, it is impossible for both parties to have the same purpose at the same time. The reason is not the general bipolarity, but the judgments made by the commanders of both sides based on the same situation.